Abstract : This paper is an investigation into the determinants of asymmetries in stock returns. We develop a series of cross-sectional regression specifications which attempt to forecast skewness in the daily returns of individual stocks. Negative skewness is most pronounced in stocks that have experienced: 1) an increase in trading volume relative to trend over the prior six months; and 2) positive returns over the prior thirty-six months. The first finding is consistent with the model of Hong and Stein (1999) , which predicts that negative asymmetries are more likely to occur when there are large differences of opinion among investors. The latter finding fits with a number of theories, most notably Blanchard and Watson's (1982) rendition of stockprice bubbles. Analogous results also obtain when we attempt to forecast the skewness of the aggregate stock market, though our statistical power in this case is limited.
Introduction
Aggregate stock-market returns are asymmetrically distributed. This asymmetry can be measured in several ways. First, and most simply, the very largest movements in the market are usually decreases, rather than increases-that is, the stock market is more prone to melt down than to melt up. For example, of the ten biggest one-day movements in the S&P 500 since 1947, nine were declines.
1 Second, a large literature documents that market returns exhibit negative skewness, or a closely related property, "asymmetric volatility"-a tendency for volatility to go up with negative returns.
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Finally, since the crash of October 1987, the prices of stock-index options have been strongly indicative of a negative asymmetry in returns, with the implied volatilities of out-of-the-money puts far exceeding those of out-of-the-money calls; this pattern has come to be known as the "smirk" in index implied volatilities.
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While the existence of negative asymmetries in market returns is generally not disputed, it is less clear what underlying economic mechanism these asymmetries reflect. Perhaps the most venerable theory is based on leverage effects (Black (1976) , Christie (1982) ), whereby a drop in prices raises operating and financial leverage, and hence the volatility of subsequent returns. However, it appears that leverage effects are not of sufficient quantitative importance to explain the data (Schwert (1989) , Bekaert and Wu (2000) ). This is especially true if one is interested in asymmetries at a relatively high frequency, e.g., in daily data. To explain these, one has to argue that intra-day changes in leverage have a large impact on volatility-that a drop in 1 Moreover, the one increase-of 9.10 percent on October 21, 1987-was right on the heels of the 20.47 percent decline on October 19, and arguably represented a correction of the microstructural distortions that arose on that chaotic day, rather than an independent price change. 2 If, in a discrete-time setting, a negative return in period t raises volatility in period t+1 and thereafter, returns measured over multiple periods will be negatively skewed, even if single-period returns are not. The literature on these phenomena includes Pindyck (1984) , French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) , Campbell and Hentschel (1992) , Nelson (1991) , Engle and Ng (1993) , Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) , Braun, Nelson and Sunier (1995) , Duffee (1995) , Bekaert and Wu (2000) and Wu (2000) . 3 See, e.g., Bates (1997) , Bakshi, Cao and Chen (1997) , and Dumas, Fleming and Whaley (1998) .
prices on Monday morning leads to a large increase in leverage and hence in volatility by
Monday afternoon, so that overall, the return for the full day Monday is negatively skewed.
An alternative theory is based on a "volatility feedback" mechanism. As developed by Pindyck (1984) , French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) , Campbell and Hentschel (1992) and others, the idea is as follows: When a large piece of good news arrives, this signals that market volatility has increased, so the direct positive effect of the good news is partially offset by an increase in the risk premium. On the other hand, when a large piece of bad news arrives, the direct effect and the risk-premium effect now go in the same direction, so the impact of the news is amplified. While the volatility-feedback story is in some ways more attractive than the leverage-effects story, there are again questions as to whether it has the quantitative kick that is needed to explain the data. The thrust of the critique, first articulated by Poterba and Summers (1986) , is that shocks to market volatility are for the most part very short-lived, and hence cannot be expected to have a large impact on risk premia.
A third explanation for asymmetries in stock-market returns comes from stochastic bubble models of the sort pioneered by Blanchard and Watson (1982) . The asymmetry here is due to the popping of the bubble-a low-probability event that produces large negative returns.
What the leverage-effects, volatility-feedback and bubble theories all have in common is that they can be cast in a representative-investor framework. In contrast, a more recent explanation of return asymmetries, Hong and Stein (1999) , argues that investor heterogeneity is central to the phenomenon. The Hong-Stein model rests on two key assumptions: 1) there are differences of opinion among investors as to fundamental value; and 2) some-though not allinvestors face short-sales constraints. The constrained investors can be thought of as mutual funds, whose charters typically prohibit them from taking short positions; the unconstrained investors can be thought of as hedge funds or other arbitrageurs.
When differences of opinion are initially large, those bearish investors who are subject to the short-sales constraint will be forced to a corner solution, in which they sell all of their shares and just sit out of the market. As a consequence of being at a corner, their information is not fully incorporated into prices. For example, if the market-clearing price is $100, and a particular investor is sitting out, it must be that his valuation is less than $100, but one has no way of knowing by how much-it could be $95, but it could also be much lower, say $50.
However, if after this information is hidden, other, previously-more-bullish investors have a change of heart and bail out of the market, the originally-more-bearish group may become the marginal "support buyers" and hence more will be learned about their signals. In particular, if the investor who was sitting out at a price of $100 jumps in and buys at $95, this is good news relative to a case where he continues to sit on the sidelines even as the price drops further. Thus accumulated hidden information tends to come out during market declines, which is another way of saying that returns are negatively skewed.
With its focus on differences of opinion, the Hong-Stein model has distinctive empirical implications that are not shared by the representative-investor theories. In particular, the HongStein model predicts that negative skewness in returns will be most pronounced around periods of heavy trading volume. This is because-like in many models with differences of opiniontrading volume proxies for the intensity of disagreement. 4 When disagreement (and hence trading volume) is high, it is more likely that bearish investors will wind up at a corner, with their information incompletely revealed in prices. And it is precisely this hiding of information that sets the stage for negative skewness in subsequent rounds of trade, when the arrival of bad news to other, previously-more bullish investors can force the hidden information to come out.
In this paper, we undertake an empirical investigation that is motivated by this differences-of-opinion theory. We develop a series of cross-sectional regression specifications that attempt to forecast skewness in the daily returns to individual stocks. Thus when we speak of "forecasting crashes" in the title of the paper, we are adopting a narrow and euphemistic definition of the word "crashes", associating it solely with the conditional skewness of the return distribution; we are not in the business of forecasting negative expected returns. This usage follows Bates (1991 Bates ( , 1997 , who also interprets conditional skewness-in his case, inferred from options prices-as a measure of crash expectations.
One of our key forecasting variables is the recent deviation of turnover from its trend.
For example, at the firm level, we ask whether the skewness in daily returns measured over a given six-month period (say July 1-December 31 1998) can be predicted from the detrended level of turnover over the prior six-month period (January 1-June 30 1998). It turns out that firms which experience larger increases in turnover relative to trend are indeed predicted to have more negative skewness; moreover, the effect of turnover is strongly statistically and economically significant.
In an effort to isolate the effects of turnover, our specifications also include a number of control variables. These control variables can be divided into two categories. In the first category are those that, like detrended turnover, capture time-varying influences on skewness.
The most significant variable in this category is past returns. We find that when past returns have been high, skewness is forecasted to become more negative. The predictive power is strongest for returns in the prior six months, but there is some ability to predict negative skewness based on returns as far back as thirty-six months. In a similar vein, glamour stocks-those with low ratios of book value to market value-are also forecasted to have more negative skewness. (Harvey and Siddique (2000) also examine how skewness varies with past returns and book-tomarket.) These results can be rationalized in a number of ways, but they are perhaps most clearly suggested by models of stochastic bubbles. In the context of a bubble model, high past returns or a low value of book-to-market imply that the bubble has been building up for a long time, so that there is a larger drop when it pops and prices fall back to fundamentals.
The second category of variables that help to explain skewness are those that appear to be picking up relatively fixed firm characteristics. For example, it has been documented by others (e.g., Damodaran (1987) , Harvey and Siddique (2000) ) that skewness is more negative on average for large-cap firms-a pattern that also shows up strongly in our multivariate regressions. We are not aware of any theories that would have naturally led one to anticipate this finding. Rather, for our purposes a variable like size is best thought of as an atheoretic controlit is included in our regressions to help ensure that we do not mistakenly attribute explanatory power to turnover when it is actually proxying for some other firm characteristic. Such a control may be redundant to the extent that detrending the turnover variable already removes firm effects, but we keep it in to be safe.
In addition to running our cross-sectional regressions with the individual-firm data, we also experiment briefly with analogous time-series regressions for the U.S. stock market as a whole. Here, we attempt to forecast the skewness in the daily returns to the market using detrended market turnover and past market returns. Obviously, this pure time-series approach entails an enormous loss in statistical power-with data going back to 1962, we have less than 70 independent observations of market skewness measured at six-month intervals-which is why it is not the main focus of our analysis. Nevertheless, it is comforting to note that the qualitative results from the aggregate-market regressions closely parallel those from the cross-sectional regressions: high values of both detrended turnover and past returns also forecast more negative market skewness. The coefficient estimates continue to imply economically meaningful effects, although that for detrended turnover is no longer statistically significant.
While both the cross-sectional and time-series results for turnover are broadly consistent with the theory we are interested in, we should stress that we do not at this point view them as a tight test. There are several reasons why one might wish to remain skeptical. First, beyond the effects of turnover, we document other strong influences on skewness, such as firm size, that are not easily rationalized within the context of the Hong-Stein model, and for which there are no other widely-accepted explanations. Second, even if innovations to trading volume do proxy for the intensity of disagreement among investors, they likely capture other factors as well-such as changes in trading costs-that we have not adequately controlled for. Finally, and most generally, our efforts to model the determinants of conditional skewness at the firm level are really quite exploratory in nature. Given how early it is in this game, we are naturally reluctant to declare an unqualified victory for any one theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review in more detail the theoretical work that motivates our empirical specification. In Section 3, we discuss our sample and the construction of our key variables. In Section 4, we present our baseline cross-sectional regressions, along with a variety of sensitivities and sample splits. In Section 5, we consider the analogous time-series regressions, in which we attempt to forecast the skewness in aggregate-market returns. In Section 6, we use an option-pricing metric to evaluate the economic significance of our results. Section 7 concludes.
Theoretical background
The model of Hong and Stein (1999) , which provides the principal motivation for our empirical tests, begins with the assumption that there are two investors, A and B, each of whom gets a private signal about a stock's terminal payoff. As a matter of objective reality, each investor's signal contains some useful information. However, A only pays attention to his own signal, even if that of B is revealed to him, and vice-versa. This deviation from full Bayesian rationality-which can be thought of as a form of overconfidence-leads to irreducible differences of opinion about the stock's value.
In addition to investors A and B, the model also incorporates a class of fully rational, risk-neutral arbitrageurs. These arbitrageurs recognize that the best estimate of the stock's true value is formed by averaging the signals of A and B. However, the arbitrageurs may not always get to see both of the signals, because A and B face short-sales constraints. Importantly, the arbitrageurs themselves are not short-sales-constrained, so they can take infinitely large positive or negative positions. Perhaps the most natural interpretation of these assumptions is not to take the short-sales constraint literally-as an absolute technological impediment to trade-but rather to think of investors A and B as institutions like equity mutual funds, many of whom are precluded by their charters or operating policies from ever taking short positions. 5 In contrast, the arbitrageurs might be thought of as hedge funds who are not subject to such restrictions.
Even though investors A and B can be said to suffer from behavioral biases (i.e., overconfidence) the market as a whole is efficient, in the sense of there being no predictability in returns. This is because of the presence of the risk-neutral, unconstrained arbitrageurs. Hence, unlike most of the behavioral finance literature, which relies on limited arbitrage, the model's only implications are for the higher-order moments of the return distribution.
There are two trading dates. To see how the model can generate asymmetries, imagine that at time 1, investor B gets a pessimistic signal, so that his valuation for the stock lies well below A's. Because of the short-sales constraint, B will simply sit out of the market, and the only trade will be between investor A and the arbitrageurs. The arbitrageurs are rational enough to figure out that B's signal is below A's, but they cannot know by how much. Thus the market price at time 1 impounds A's prior information, but does not fully reflect B's time-1 signal. In order to isolate this particular theoretical effect, we need to be aware of other potentially confounding factors. For example, it is well-known that trading volume is correlated with past returns (Shefrin and Statman (1985) , Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), Odean (1998b) ).
And, as noted above, past returns might also help predict skewness, if there are stochastic bubbles of the sort described by Blanchard and Watson (1982) . 7 Indeed, just such a pattern has been documented in recent work by Harvey and Siddique (2000) . To control for this tendency, all of our regressions include a number of lags of past returns on the right-hand side.
In a similar vein, one might also worry about skewness being correlated with volatility.
There are a number of models which can deliver such a correlation; e.g., in the volatilityfeedback model of Campbell and Hentschel (1992) , higher levels of volatility are associated with more negative skewness. To the extent that such an effect is present in our data, we would like to know whether turnover is forecasting skewness directly-as it should, according to the HongStein model-or whether it is really just forecasting volatility, which is in turn correlated with skewness. To address this concern, all of our regressions include some control for volatility, and we experiment with several ways of doing this control.
Data
To construct our variables, we begin with data on daily stock prices and monthly trading volume for all NYSE and AMEX firms, from the CRSP daily and monthly stock files. Our sample period begins in July 1962, which is as far back as we can get the trading volume data; because our regressions use many lags, we do not actually begin to forecast returns until December 1965. We do not include NASDAQ firms. This is because we want to have a uniform and accurate measure of trading volume, and the dealer nature of the NASDAQ market is likely to render turnover in its stocks not directly comparable to that of NYSE and AMEX stocks. We also follow convention and exclude ADRs, REITs, closed-end funds, primes and scores-i.e., stocks that do not have a CRSP share type code of 10 or 11.
For most of our analysis, we further truncate the sample by eliminating the very smallest stocks in the NYSE/AMEX universe-in particular, those with a market capitalization below the 20 th percentile NYSE breakpoint. We do so because our goal is to use trading volume as a proxy for differences of opinion. Theoretical models that relate trading volume to differences of opinion typically assume that transactions costs are zero. In reality, variations in transactions costs are likely to be an important driver of trading volume, and more so for very small stocks.
By eliminating the smallest stocks, we hope to raise the ratio of signal (differences of opinion) to noise (transactions costs) in our key explanatory variable. We also report some sensitivities in which the smallest stocks are analyzed separately (see Table 4 below), and as one would expect from this discussion, the coefficients on turnover for this subsample are noticeably smaller.
Our baseline measure of skewness, which we denote NCSKEW, for "negative coefficient of skewness", is calculated by taking the negative of (the sample analog to) the third moment of daily returns, and dividing it by (the sample analog to) the standard deviation of daily returns raised to the third power. Thus for any stock i over any six-month period t, we have:
where R it represents the sequence of demeaned daily returns to stock i during period t, and n is the number of observations on daily returns during the period. 8 These daily "returns" are, more precisely, actually log changes in price. We use log changes as opposed to simple daily percentage returns because they allow for a natural benchmark-if stock returns were lognormally distributed, then an NCSKEW measure based on log changes should have a mean of zero. However, we have also redone everything with an NCSKEW measure based instead on simple daily percentage returns, and none of our main results are affected. 8 In calculating NCSKEW, as well as any other moments which rely on daily return data, we drop any firm which has more than five missing observations on daily returns in a given period. 9 Using simple percentage returns instead of log changes does have two (predictable) effects: 1) it makes returns look more postively skewed on average; and 2) it induces a pronounced correlation between skewness and Scaling the raw third moment by the standard deviation cubed allows for comparisons across stocks with different variances; this is the usual normalization for skewness statistics (Greene (1993) ). By putting a minus sign in front of the third moment, we are adopting the convention that an increase in NCSKEW corresponds to a stock being more "crash prone"-i.e., having a more left-skewed distribution.
For most of our regressions, the daily firm-level returns that go into the calculation of the NCSKEW variable are market-adjusted returns-the log change in stock i less the log change in the value-weighted CRSP index for that day. However, we also rerun everything with variations of NCSKEW based on both: 1) excess returns (the log change in stock i less the T-bill return); as well as 2) beta-adjusted returns. As will be seen, these variations do not make much difference to our results with NCSKEW.
In addition to NCSKEW, we also work with a second measure of return asymmetries which does not involve third moments, and hence is less likely to be overly influenced by a handful of extreme days. This alternative measure, which we denote by DUVOL, for "down-toup volatility", is computed as follows. For any stock i over any six-month period t, we separate all the days with returns below the period mean ("down" days) from those with returns above the period mean ("up" days), and compute the standard deviation for each of these sub-samples separately. We then take the log of the ratio of (the sample analog to) the standard deviation on the down days to (the sample analog to) the standard deviation on the up days. Thus we have:
contemporaneously measured volatility. However, given that we control for volatility in all of our regression specifications, using simple percentage returns does not materially alter the coefficients on turnover and past returns.
where n u and n d are the number of up and down days, respectively. Again, the convention is that a higher value of this measure corresponds to a more left-skewed distribution. To preview, our results with NCSKEW and DUVOL are for the most part quite similar, so it does not appear that they depend on a particular parametric representation of return asymmetries.
In our regressions with firm-level data, we use non-overlapping six-month observations on skewness. In particular, the NCSKEW and DUVOL measures are calculated using either data from January 1-June 30, or July 1-December 31 of each calendar year. We could alternatively use overlapping data-so that we would have a new skewness measure every month-but there is little payoff to doing so, since, as will become clear shortly, we already have more than enough statistical power as is.
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When we turn to the time-series regressions with aggregatemarket data, statistical power becomes a real issue, and we use overlapping observations.
The choice of a six-month horizon for measuring skewness is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. In principle, the effects that we are interested in could be playing themselves out over a shorter horizon, so that trading volume on Monday forecasts skewness for the rest of the week, but has little predictive power beyond that. Unfortunately, the model of Hong and Stein (1999) does not give us much guidance in this regard. Lacking this theoretical guidance, our choice to use six months' worth of daily returns to estimate skewness is driven more by measurement concerns. For example, if we estimated skewness using only one month's worth of data, we would presumably have more measurement error; this is particularly relevant given that a higherorder moment like skewness is strongly influenced by outliers in the data. The important point to note, however, is that to the extent that our measurement horizon does not correspond well to the underlying theory, this should simply blur our ability to find what the theory predicts-i.e., it should make our tests too conservative.
Besides the skewness measures, the other variables that we use are very familiar and do not merit much discussion. SIGMA it is the standard deviation of stock i's daily returns, measured over the six-month period t. RET it is the cumulative return on stock i, also measured over the six-month period t. When NCSKEW or DUVOL is computed using either marketadjusted or beta-adjusted returns, SIGMA and RET are computed using market-adjusted returns.
When NCSKEW or DUVOL is computed using excess returns, SIGMA and RET are based on excess returns as well.
LOGSIZE it is the log of firm i's stock-market capitalization at the end of period t.
BK/MKT it is firm i's book-to-market ratio at the end of period t. LOGCOVER it is the log of one plus the number of analysts (from the I/B/E/S database) covering firm i at the end of period t.
TURNOVER it is the average monthly share turnover in stock i-defined as shares traded divided by shares outstanding-over period t.
In our baseline specification, we work with detrended turnover, which we denote DTURNOVER. The detrending is done very simply, by subtracting from the TURNOVER variable a moving average of its value over the prior eighteen months. Again, the rationale for doing this detrending is that, as a matter of conservatism, we want to eliminate any component of turnover that can be thought of as a relatively fixed firm characteristic. This detrending is roughly analogous to doing a fixed-effects specification in a shorter-lived panel. Since we have such a long time series, it makes little sense to impose that firm effects are literally constant over the entire sample period. Instead, the detrending controls for firm characteristics that adjust gradually. 2) five size-based sub-samples; and 3) the market as a whole, defined as the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX index. (When working with the market as a whole, all the variables are based on simple excess returns relative to T-Bills.) Panels B and C look at contemporaneous correlations and autocorrelations respectively, for the sample of individual firms. In Panels B and C, as in most of our subsequent regression analysis, we restrict the sample to those firms with a market capitalization above the 20 th percentile NYSE breakpoint.
One interesting point that emerges from Panel A is that while there is negative skewness-i.e., positive mean values of NCSKEW and DUVOL-for the market as a whole, the opposite is true for individual stocks, which are positively skewed. This discrepancy can in principle be understood within the strict confines of the Hong-Stein (1999) model, since, as was noted above, the model allows for either positive or negative unconditional skewness, depending on the degree of ex-ante investor heterogeneity. In other words, if one is willing to assume that differences of opinion about the market are on average more pronounced than differences of opinion about individual stocks, the model can produce negative skewness for the latter and positive skewness for the former.
However, it is not clear that such an assumption is empirically defensible. An alternative interpretation of the data in Table 1 .A is that even if the Hong-Stein model provides a reasonable account of skewness in market returns, it must be missing something when it comes to explaining the mean skewness of individual stocks. For example, it might be that large positive events like hostile takeovers-which the theory ignores-impart an added degree of positive skewness to individual stocks but wash out across the market as a whole. This view does not imply that we cannot learn something about the theory by looking at firm-level data; the theory will certainly gain some credence if it does a good job of explaining cross-sectional variation in skewness, even if it cannot fit the mean skewness at the firm level. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing the caveat that, without further embellishments, the theory may not provide a convincing rationale for everything that is going on at the individual stock level.
The most noteworthy fact in Panel B of Table 1 is the contemporaneous correlation between our two skewness measures, NCSKEW and DUVOL, which is .88. While these two measures are quite different in their construction, they appear to be picking up much the same information. Also worth pointing out is that the correlation between NCSKEW and SIGMA is less than .01, while that between DUVOL and SIGMA is about -.08; these low correlations lend some preliminary (and comforting) support to the notion that forecasting either of our skewness measures is a quite distinct exercise from forecasting volatility. Panel C documents that, unlike SIGMA-which has an autocorrelation coefficient of .72-neither of our skewness measures has much persistence. For NCSKEW the autocorrelation is on the order of .05; for DUVOL it is .09. DTURNOVER it ; and six lags of past returns, RET it …..RET it-5 . We also include dummy variables for each time period t. The regression can be interpreted as an effort to predict-based on information available at the end of period t-cross-sectional variation in skewness over period t+1.
Forecasting skewness in the cross-section

Baseline specification
In column 1, we use market-adjusted returns as the basis for computing the NCSKEW measure. In column 2 we use beta-adjusted returns, and in column 3 we use simple excess returns. As can be seen, the results are quite similar in all three cases. In particular, the coefficients on detrended turnover are positive and strongly statistically significant in each of the three columns, albeit somewhat larger (by about 20%) in magnitude when market-adjusted returns are used. 11 The past return terms are also always positive and strongly significant. Thus stocks that have experienced either a surge in turnover or high past returns are predicted to have more negative skewness-i.e., to become more crash-prone, all else equal. The coefficient on size is also positive, suggesting that negative skewness is more likely in large-cap stocks.
As noted above, the findings for past returns and size run broadly parallel to previous work by Harvey and Siddique (2000) . Nevertheless, there are several distinctions between our results and theirs. To begin, ours are couched in a multivariate regression framework, while theirs are based on univariate sorts. But more significantly, our measure of skewness is quite different from theirs, for two reasons. First, we look at daily returns, while they look at monthly returns. Second, we look at individual stocks, while they look at portfolios of stocks.
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We have actually done some detailed comparisons to make these latter points explicit.
For 25 portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market, we have computed both: 1) the skewness of monthly portfolio returns, as in Harvey and Siddique (2000) were by no means a foregone conclusion.
As we have already stressed, the positive coefficient on size is not something one would have necessarily predicted ex ante based on the Hong-Stein (1999) model. Nevertheless, it is possible to come up with rationalizations after the fact. Suppose that managers can to some extent control the rate at which information about their firms gets out. It seems plausible that if they uncover good news, they will disclose all this good news right away. In contrast, if they are sitting on bad news, they may try to delay its release, with the result that the bad news dribbles out slowly. This behavior will tend to impart positive skewness to firm-level returns, and may explain why returns on individual stocks are on average positively skewed at the same time that market returns are negatively skewed. Moreover, if one adds the further assumption that it is easier for managers of small firms to temporarily hide bad news-since they face less scrutiny from outside analysts than do managers of large firms-the resulting positive skewness will be more pronounced for small firms. We return to this idea in Section 4.5 below, and use it to develop some additional testable implications.
Robustness
In Table 3 we conduct a number of further robustness checks. Everything is a variation on column 1 of Table 2 , and uses an NCSKEW measure based on market-adjusted returns. First, in 12 The skewness of a portfolio of stocks is not the same thing as the average skewness of its component stocks, especially if, as Harvey and Siddique (2000) stress, coskewness varies systematically with firm characteristics.
column 1 of Table 3 , we truncate outliers of the NCSKEW variable, setting all observations that are more than three standard deviations from the mean in any period t to the three-standarddeviation tail values in that period. As can be seen, this has little impact on the results, suggesting that they are not driven by a handful of outlier observations.
In column 2, we replace the DTURNOVER variable with its un-detrended analog,
TURNOVER. This means that we are now admitting into consideration differences in turnover across firms that are not merely temporary deviations from trend, but rather, more long-run firm characteristics. In other words, we are essentially removing our fixed-effect control from the turnover variable. According to the theory, one might expect that long-run cross-firm variation in turnover would also predict skewness-some firms might be subject to persistently large differences in investor opinion, and these too should matter for return asymmetries. The coefficient estimate on TURNVOVER in column 2 confirms this notion, roughly doubling in magnitude from its base-case value. This implies that our fixed-effect approach of using DTURNOVER instead of TURNOVER everywhere else in the paper is quite conservative-in doing so, we are throwing out a dimension of the data that is strongly supportive of the theory.
In columns 3 and 4, we investigate whether our results are somehow tied to the way that we have controlled for volatility. Recall that the central issue here is whether DTURNOVER it is really forecasting NCSKEW it+1 directly, or whether it is instead forecasting SIGMA it+1 , and showing up in the regression only because SIGMA it+1 is correlated with NCSKEW it+1 . Thus ideally, we would like to add a period-t control variable to the regression that is a good forecast of SIGMA it+1 , so that we can verify that DTURNOVER it is still significant even after the inclusion of this control. Our use of SIGMA it in the base-case specification can be motivated on the grounds that it is probably the best univariate predictor of SIGMA it+1 , given the very pronounced serial correlation in the SIGMA variable.
But of course, just using one past lag is not necessarily the best way to forecast SIGMA it+1 . One can presumably do better by allowing for richer dynamics. In this spirit, we add in column 3 two further lags of SIGMA (SIGMA it-1 and SIGMA it-2 ) to the base-case specification. These two lags are insignificant, and hence our coefficient on DTURNOVER it , as well as those on the six RET terms, are virtually unchanged.
13
In column 4 we take this logic one step further. We create a fitted value of SIGMA it+1 -which we denote by SIGMAHAT it+1 -based on the following information set available in period t: SIGMA it ; SIGMA it-1 ; SIGMA it-2 ; LOGSIZE it ; DTURNOVER it ; and RET it …..RET it-5 . We then replace SIGMA it in the base case with this fitted value of future volatility, SIGMAHAT it+1 .
This is equivalent to an instrumental-variables regression in which future volatility SIGMA it+1 is included on the right-hand side, but is instrumented for using the information available in period t. As can be seen, this variation leads to almost exactly the same results as in the base case.
Overall, based on the evidence in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 , we conclude that it is highly unlikely that our base-case success in forecasting NCSKEW with the DTURNOVER and RET variables arises because these variables are able to forecast SIGMA. In other words, these variables really appear to be predicting cross-firm differences in the asymmetry of stock returns, rather than just differences in volatility.
In column 5, we add to the base-case specification BK/MKT, the book-to-market ratio.
This variable attracts a significant negative coefficient, which means that it tells the same story as the past-return terms: glamour stocks, like those with high past returns, are more crash-prone.
However, the addition of BK/MKT has no impact on the DTURNOVER coefficient.
In column 6, we use the DUVOL measure of return asymmetry as the left-hand-side variable in place of NCSKEW. Although the difference in units precludes a direct comparison of the point estimates, the qualitative patterns are generally the same as in the corresponding specification in column 1 of Table 2 . Indeed, the t-statistic on DTURNOVER is now actually a bit higher (4.35 vs. 3.84) as is the R 2 of the regression (6.7% vs. 3.0%).
Finally, in an unreported sensitivity, we check to make sure our results are robust to how we have modeled the effect of the lagged skewness variable, NCSKEW it . Instead of estimating just one coefficient on NCSKEW it , we now allow this effect to be a function of the realization of NCSKEW it itself. We implement this by interacting NCSKEW it with five dummy variables, one corresponding to each quintile of NCSKEW it . In other words, we estimate five separate slope coefficients on lagged skewness, depending on the quintile that lagged skewness falls in. As it turns out, while there appear to be some modest non-linearities in the effect of lagged skewness, these non-linearities do not at all impact the coefficients on any of the other variables of interest.
Cuts on firm size
In Table 4 , we disaggregate our base-case analysis by size. We take the specification from column 1 of Table 2 , and run it separately for five size-based sub-samples, corresponding to quintiles based on NYSE breakpoints. (Recall that in Tables 2 and 3 , we omitted the smallest of these five quintiles from our sample.) Two conclusions stand out. First, as suspected, the coefficient on DTURNOVER for the smallest category of firms is noticeably lower than for any other group, albeit still positive. 14 Again, this is probably because variation in turnover for these tiny firms is driven in large part by variation in trading costs, whereas our theory requires a good proxy for differences of opinion. Second, once one moves beyond the smallest quintile, the coefficients look reasonably stable. There is certainly no hint that the effects that we are interested in go away for larger firms. Indeed, the highest point estimate for the DTURNOVER coefficient comes from the next-to-largest quintile.
The fact that the coefficients on DTURNOVER are robust for large firms is not surprising in light of the underlying theory. As we have emphasized, the model of Hong and
Stein (1999) is not predicated on impediments to arbitrage-it incorporates a class of fully riskneutral arbitrageurs who can take infinite long or short positions. Thus as long as some investors other than the arbitrageurs (e.g., mutual funds) continue to be short-sales constrained, the model does not have the feature that the key effects diminish as one moves to larger stocks, where arbitrage activity is presumably more efficient. This is in contrast to behavioral models based on limited arbitrage (e.g., DeLong et al (1990)) whose implications for return predictability are often thought of as applying more forcefully to small stocks. 
Stability over sub-periods
In Table 5 , we examine the intertemporal stability of our baseline regression, using a Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach. Specifically, we now run a separate, purely cross-sectional variant of the regression in column 1 of Table 2 for every one of the 66 six-month periods in our sample. We then take simple time-averages of the cross-sectional regression coefficients over various sub-periods, and compute the associated t-statistics based on the time-series properties of the coefficients (and adjusting for serial correlation). In Panel A of Moreover, even taken alone, three of the four decade-based subperiods produce a statistically significant result for DTURNOVER.
Why are small stocks more positively skewed?
One of the most striking patterns that we have documented is that small stocks are more positively skewed than large stocks. Given that this pattern is not clearly predicted by any existing theories (of which we are aware) we have had to come up with a new hypothesis after the fact in order to rationalize it. As described above, this hypothesis begins with the assumption that managers have some discretion over the disclosure of information, and prefer to announce good news immediately, while allowing bad news to dribble out slowly. This behavior tends to impart a degree of positive skewness to returns. Moreover, if there is more scope for such managerial discretion in small firms-say because they face less scrutiny from security analysts-then the positive-skewness effect will be more pronounced in small stocks.
The one satisfying thing about this after-the-fact hypothesis is that it yields new testable predictions. Specifically, controlling for size, positive skewness ought to be greater in firms with fewer analysts. Table 6 investigates this prediction, taking our baseline specifications for both NCSKEW and DUVOL, and in each case adding LOGCOVER, the log of one plus the number of analysts covering the stock. (The sample period in Table 6 is shorter, since analyst coverage is not available from I/B/E/S prior to December 1976.) The coefficients on LOGCOVER have the predicted positive sign, and are strongly statistically significant.
16
The coefficients on LOGSIZE go down a bit, but remain significant as well. Nothing else changes.
We do not mean to cast Table 6 as a definitive test of the discretionary-disclosure hypothesis; this idea is outside the main scope of the paper, and pursuing it more seriously would take us too far afield. Nevertheless, it is comforting to know that the most obvious auxiliary prediction of the hypothesis is borne out in the data, and that as a result, we at least have a plausible explanation for what would otherwise be a puzzling feature of our data.
Forecasting market skewness
We now turn to forecasting skewness in the returns to the aggregate market. While this is in many ways the more interesting exercise from an economic viewpoint, our statistical power is severely limited. Thus it may be asking too much to expect that the results here will be strongly statistically significant in their own right; rather one might more reasonably hope that they look qualitatively similar to those from the cross-sectional regressions.
Our definition of the aggregate market is the value-weighted NYSE-AMEX index, and 16 After developing the discretionary-disclosure hypothesis, and running the regressions in Table 6 , we became aware of a closely related working paper by Damodaran (1987) . Using data from 1979-83, he also finds that firms with fewer analysts have more positively skewed returns.
all returns are excess returns relative to T-bills. To avoid any temptation to further mine the data, we use essentially the same specification as in our baseline cross-sectional analysis.
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Specifically, we use all the same right-hand-side variables, except for LOGSIZE and the time dummies. The DTURNOVER variable is constructed exactly as before, by detrending TURNOVER with its own moving average over the prior 18 months.
In an effort to get the most out of the little time-series data that we have, we now use monthly overlapping observations. (The t-statistics we report are adjusted accordingly.) This yields a total of 401 observations that can be used in the regressions. However, a new concern that arises with the time-series approach is the extent to which our inferences are dominated by the enormous daily movements during October 1987. To address this concern, we also re-run our regressions omitting October 1987. This brings us down to 371 observations.
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The results are summarized in Table 7 . In columns 1 and 2 we use the NCSKEW measure of skewness, and run the regressions with and without October 1987, respectively. In columns 3 and 4 we use the DUVOL measure of skewness, and again run the regression with and without October 1987. The basic story is the same in all four columns. The six past-return terms are always positive, and many are individually statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient on DTURNOVER, while it is positive in each of the four regressions, is never statistically significant. Dropping October 1987 seems to increase the precision of the DTURNOVER coefficient estimate somewhat, but the highest t-statistic across the four specifications is only 1.15.
17 Harvey and Siddique (1999) build an autoregressive conditional skewness model for aggregate-market returns. While their specification is very different from that here, it shares the common element that lagged skewness helps to forecast future skewness. 18 The reason that we lose 30 observations is that we do not allow any observation on NCSKEW, DUVOL, SIGMA or DTURNOVER to enter the regression if it draws on data from October 1987. Because of the detrending, the DTURNOVER variable in any given month draws on 24 months' worth of data.
Nevertheless, holding statistical significance aside, the point estimates suggest large quantitative effects relative to the cross-sectional regressions. Indeed, the coefficients on DTURNOVER and the RET terms are now on the order of ten times bigger than they were in the previous tables. Thus both turnover and past returns may well be very important for forecasting the skewness of market returns, but we lack the statistical power to assert these conclusionsparticularly that for turnover-with much confidence.
In light of this power problem, we obtained an alternative series on NYSE volume going back to 1928 from Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992) , who in turn take it from the S&P Security Price Record. The one drawback with this data is that we cannot use it to literally calculate turnover, since it gives only the number of shares traded and not the number of shares outstanding. Thus we cannot quite reproduce our baseline specifications for the longer post-1928 sample period. Nevertheless, using detrended values of raw trading volume to approximate detrended turnover, we get results for this sample period that are very similar to those reported in Table 7 .
Economic significance of the results: an option-pricing metric
Thus far, we have focused on the statistical significance of our results, and have not really asked whether they imply magnitudes that are economically meaningful. Assessing economic significance in the current context is a bit tricky. To help frame things in a way that is hopefully more intuitive, we can translate statements about NCSKEW into statements about the prices of out-of-the-money put options.
The idea behind our metric can be understood as follows. Imagine that you are pricing an out-ofthe-money put on a stock whose returns you initially believe to be symmetrically distributedi.e., a stock for which you believe that NCSKEW is equal to zero. Now the stock experiences a surge in turnover. As a result, you revise your forecast of NCSKEW, using the DTURNOVER coefficient estimate from our regressions. Given this new forecast of NCSKEW-but holding volatility fixed-by how much does the value of the put option increase?
To answer this sort of question precisely, we need to: 1) find an option-pricing model that admits skewness in returns; and 2) create a mapping from the parameters of this model to our NCSKEW variable. The model we use is the stochastic-volatility model of Das and Sundaram (1999) , in which the dynamics of stock prices are summarized by the following two diffusion equations: dp t = "dt + V t 1/2 dz 1 (3)
Here p t is the log of the stock price, " is the expected return on the stock, V t is the current variance, 6 is the mean reversion parameter for the variance process, V 0 is the long-run mean level of variance and 0 is the volatility of the variance process. The two Wiener processes dz 1 and dz 2 are instantaneously correlated, with a correlation coefficient of D. The parameter D is the one of central interest for our purposes, as it governs the skewness of stock returns: when D = 0, log returns are symmetrically distributed; when D < 0, log returns are negatively skewed.
In order to map the parameters of the option-pricing model into our NCSKEW variable, we draw on formulas given in Das and Sundaram (1999) We also set the stock price P = 100, and the riskless rate r = 0. We begin with a hypothetical Firm 1, which has symmetrically distributed returns-i.e., it has NCSKEW = 0. This is equivalent to a value of D = 0. Next, we take Firm 2, which is identical to Firm 1, except that it has a two standard-deviation higher value of DTURNOVER. The standard deviation of DTURNOVER (for firms above the 20 th percentile NYSE breakpoint) is 0.042, and from Table   2 , column 1, the coefficient on DTURNOVER is 0.437. Hence the value of NCSKEW for Firm 2 is 0.037 (2 x 0.042 x 0.437 = 0.037). Using equation (21) in Das and Sundaram (1999, page 223) this value of skewness in daily returns for Firm 2 can be shown to imply D = -0.38, assuming all the other diffusion parameters stay fixed.
Panel A of Table 8 displays the impact of this change in D for the prices of six-month European put options. That is, it calculates put prices for both Firm 1 (which has NCKSEW = 0 and thus D = 0) and Firm 2 (which has NCSKEW = 0.037 and thus D = -0.38). As can be seen, the impact on put prices is substantial, particularly if one goes relatively far out-of-the-money.
For example, a put with a strike of 70 is worth 1.20 for Firm 1, but 1.44 for Firm 2, an increase of 20.14%. Or expressed in a different way, the Firm-1 put has a Black-Scholes (1973) implied volatility of 40.33%, while the Firm-2 put has an implied volatility of 42.50%.
Panel B undertakes a similar experiment to gauge the significance of our time-series results. We keep all the diffusion parameters the same as in Panel A, except that we now set V 0 = V t = 0.04, corresponding to an annual standard deviation of returns of 20%. For the market as a whole, the standard deviation of DTURNOVER is 0.005 (see Table 1 .A). Using the coefficient estimate on DTURNOVER of 6.00 from Table 7 , column 1, a two-standard-deviation shock to DTURNOVER translates into a movement of 0.06 in the NCSKEW variable. Given the other diffusion parameters, this value of 0.06 for NCSKEW is equivalent to D = -0.33.
Panel B then compares the prices of six-month European puts across two regimes, the first with D = 0, and the second with D = -0.33. Once again, the differences appear to be meaningful. For example, a put with a strike price of 85 is worth 0.86 in Regime 1, but 1.07 in Regime 2, an increase of 24.66%. The corresponding implied volatilities are 20.36% and 21.84% respectively. These results reinforce a point made above: while the time-series estimates may be statistically much weaker than those from the cross-section, they are no less suggestive of important economic effects.
Although they are not shown in Table 8 , we have also done similar calculations to measure the economic significance of our results for past returns. As it turns out, the quantitative influence of past returns on skewness is stronger than that of trading volume. With individual stocks, a shock of 40% to the RET variable in the most recent six-month period (note from Table 1 that 40% is approximately a two-standard deviation shock for a firm in the next-to-largest quintile) translates into a movement of 0.087 in the NCSKEW variable. This in turn is equivalent to D going from zero to -0.920, which causes the put with the 70 strike to rise in value from 1.20 to 1.73, a 44.86% increase.
In the case of the aggregate market, the coefficients on past returns suggest effects on skewness that are so large that they cannot generally be captured in the context of a pure diffusion model like that of Das and Sundaram (1999) . For example, even if the RET variable has moved by only 7% in the last six months, one has to adjust D from zero to -0.978 to reflect the corresponding predicted change in NCSKEW. Given that the standard deviation of RET for the market is about 11%, this means that we cannot even capture a one-standard deviation shock to six-month returns without violating the constraint that the absolute value of D not exceed one.
Rather, we are left to conclude that, for the market as a whole, large movements in past returns
give rise to conditional negative skewness that is so substantial that it cannot be adequately represented in terms of a pure diffusion process-one would instead need some type of mixed jump-diffusion model.
Conclusions
Three robust findings about conditional skewness emerge from our analysis of individual stocks. In the cross-section, negative skewness is greater in stocks that: 1) have experienced an increase in trading volume relative to trend over the prior six months; 2) have had positive returns over the prior thirty-six months; and 3) are larger in terms of market capitalization. The first two results also have direct analogs in the time-series behavior of the aggregate market, though the statistical power of our tests in this case (especially with respect to trading volume) is quite limited.
Let us try to put each of these findings into some perspective. The first, regarding trading volume, is the most novel, and is the one we were looking for based on a specific theoretical prediction from the model of Hong and Stein (1999) . Clearly, our results here are supportive of the theory. At the same time, this does not mean that there are not other plausible interpretations.
While we have attempted to control for some of the most obvious alternative stories, no doubt there are others that can be thought up. This caveat would seem to be particularly relevant given that there has been so little research to date on conditional skewness at the individual stock level.
The second and third findings, having to do with the effects of past returns and size on skewness, do not speak directly to predictions made by the Hong-Stein model. Rather, these variables are included in our regressions because prior work (Harvey and Siddique (2000)) suggests that they might enter significantly, and we want to be careful to isolate the effects of trading volume from other factors.
Having verified the importance of past returns, we have found it helpful to think about it in terms of models of stochastic bubbles, such as that developed by Blanchard and Watson (1982) . However, we would stop well short of claiming to have strong evidence in favor of the existence of bubbles. Indeed, there is a large body of research from the 1980's (see, e.g., West
(1988) and Flood and Hodrick (1990) for reviews) that focuses on a very different set of implications of bubble models-having to do with the relationship between prices and measures of fundamentals such as dividends-and tends to come to mostly skeptical conclusions on this question. Rather, the more modest statement to be made is that previous research has not examined the implications of bubble models for conditional skewness, and that on this one score, the bubble models look pretty good.
With respect to the third finding-that small-cap stocks are more positively skewed than large-cap stocks-we are not even aware of an existing theory that provides a simple explanation. Instead, we have developed an informal hypothesis after the fact, based on the ideas that: 1) managers prefer to disclose good news right away, while dribbling bad news out slowly;
and 2) managers of small companies have more scope for hiding bad news from the market in this way. This discretionary-disclosure hypothesis in turn yields the further prediction that, controlling for size, positive skewness ought to be more pronounced in stocks with fewer analysts-a prediction which is clearly supported in the data.
A fair criticism of this whole line of discussion is that we have three main empirical results, and a different theoretical story for each: the Hong-Stein (1999) model to explain the effect of turnover on skewness; stochastic bubbles to explain the effect of past returns; and discretionary disclosure to explain the effect of size. This lack of unity is unsatisfying, and it serves to further underscore our previous caveat about the extent to which one should at this point consider any single theory to be strongly supported by the data. A natural challenge for future work in this area is to come up with a parsimonious model that captures these three patterns in a more integrated fashion. The sample period is from July 1962 to December 1998, except for LOGCOVER t which is measured starting in December 1976. NCSKEW t is the negative coefficient of (daily) skewness, measured using market-adjusted returns in the six-month period t. DUVOL t is the log of the ratio of down-day to up-day standard deviation, measured using market-adjusted returns in the six-month period t. SIGMA t is the standard deviation of (daily) market-adjusted returns measured in the six-month period t. LOGSIZE t is the log of market capitalization measured at the end of period t. BK/MKT t is the most recently available observation of book-to-market ratio at the end of period t. LOGCOVER t is the log of one plus the number of analysts covering the stock at the end of period t. DTURNOVER t is average monthly turnover in the six-month period t, detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior eighteen months. TURNOVER t is the average monthly turnover measured in the six-month period t. RET t is marketadjusted cumulative return in the six-month period t. Size quintiles determined using NYSE breakpoints. The sample period is from July 1962 to December 1998 and includes only those firms with market capitalization above the 20 th percentile breakpoint of NYSE. The dependent variable is NCSKEW t+1 the negative coefficient of (daily) skewness in the six-month period t+1. NCSKEW t+1 is computed based on returns that are market-adjusted, beta-adjusted and simple excess returns in cols 1-3 respectively. SIGMA t is the (daily) standard deviation of returns in the six-month period t. LOGSIZE t is the log of market capitalization at the end of period t. DTURNOVER t is average monthly turnover in the six-month period t, detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior eighteen months. RET t ....RET t-5 are returns in the six-month periods t through t-5 (these past returns are market adjusted in cols. 1-2 and excess in col. 3). All regressions also contain dummies for each time period, not shown. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The sample period is from July 1962 to December 1998 and includes only those firms with market capitalization above the 20 th percentile breakpoint of NYSE. In columns 1-5, the dependent variable is NCSKEW t+1 the negative coefficient of (daily) skewness in the six-month period t+1. In column 6, the dependent variable is DUVOL t+1 the log of the ratio of down-day to up-day standard deviation in the sixmonth period t+1. In all columns returns are market-adjusted. SIGMA t is the standard deviation of (daily) returns in the six-month period t. LOGSIZE t is the log of market capitalization at the end of period t. BK/MKT t is the most recently available observation of book-to-market ratio at the end of period t. DTURNOVER t is average monthly turnover in the six-month period t, detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior eighteen months, except in column 3, where turnover is not detrended. RET t ....RET t-5 are returns in the six-month periods t through t-5. SIGMAHAT t+1 is the predicted value of SIGMA t+1 calculated from a regression of SIGMA t+1 on SIGMA t ,…,SIGMA t-2 , LOGSIZE t , DTURNOVER t and RET t ....RET t-5 . All regressions also contain dummies for each time period, not shown. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The sample period is from July 1962 to December 1998. The dependent variable in all columns is NCSKEW t+1 the negative coefficient of (daily) skewness in the six-month period t+1. In all columns, returns are market-adjusted. SIGMA t is the standard deviation of (daily) returns in the six-month period t. LOGSIZE t is the log of market capitalization at the end of period t. DTURNOVER t is average monthly turnover in the six-month period t, detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior eighteen months. RET t ....RET t-5 are returns in the six-month periods t through t-5. All regressions also contain dummies for each time period, not shown. The sample period is from July 1962 to December 1998 and includes only those firms with market capitalization above the 20 th percentile breakpoint of NYSE. The dependent variable is NCSKEW t+1 the negative coefficient of (daily) skewness in the six-month period t+1. In all cases, returns are marketadjusted. The specification is the same as in col. 1 of Table 2 . SIGMA t is the standard deviation of (daily) returns in the six-month period t. LOGSIZE t is the log of market capitalization at the end of period t. DTURNOVER t is average monthly turnover in the six-month period t, detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior eighteen months. RET t ....RET t-5 are returns in the six-month periods t through t-5. Panel A reports only the coefficient on DTURNOVER t for each period. Panel B reports the mean coefficients for different sub-periods, and the associated t-statistics, based on the time-series standard deviations of the coefficients, and adjusted for serial correlation. The sample period is from December 1976 to December 1998 and includes only those firms with market capitalization above the 20 th percentile breakpoint of the NYSE. The dependent variable in col. 1 is NCSKEW t+1 the negative coefficient of skewness in the six-month period t+1 and in col. 2 is DUVOL t+1 , the log of the ratio of down-day to up-day standard deviation in the six-month period t+1. SIGMA t is the standard deviation of (daily) returns in the six-month period t. LOGSIZE t is the log of market capitalization at the end of period t. LOGCOVER t is the log of one plus the number of analysts covering the stock at the end of period t. DTURNOVER t is average monthly turnover in the six-month period t, detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior eighteen months. RET t ....RET t-5 are returns in the six-month periods t through t-5. All regressions also contain dummies for each time period, not shown. t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The sample period is from July 1962 to December 1998 and is based on market returns in excess of the risk-free rate, where the market is defined as the value weighted portfolio of all NYSE/AMEX stocks. The dependent variable in cols. 1 and 2 is NCSKEW t+1 the negative coefficient of skewness in the six-month period t+1 and in cols. 3 and 4 is DUVOL t+1 , the log of the ratio of down-day to up-day standard deviation in the six-month period t+1. SIGMA t is the standard deviation of (daily) market returns in the six-month period t. DTURNOVER t is the average monthly turnover of the market portfolio in the six-month period t, detrended by a moving average of turnover in the prior eighteen months. RET t ....RET t-5 are returns in the six-month periods t through t-5. t-statistics, which are in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
Using
Panel A: Options on Individual Stocks
The benchmark parameters are as follows: stock price P=100, interest rate r=0, annualized long run variance V 0 =.16, current variance V=.16, mean reversion in variance κ=1, volatility of variance η=.4 Firm 1 is assumed to have a value of ρ=0. Firm 2 is assumed to have a value of ρ=-.38. These values of ρ imply that the difference in daily skewness between Firm 1 and Firm 2 is equivalent to that created by a two-standard-deviation move in the DTURNOVER variable, using our baseline firm-level sample and coefficient estimates from 
